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Representation for the Poor in State
Rulemaking
Allan Ashman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

The Silent Poor

After a violent summer of urban unrest and civil disorder, President
Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders in 1967 to find out what happened in our nation's cities, why it
happened, and to suggest ways to prevent it from occurring again. One
of the findings of the Commission was that from the vantage point of the
poor ghetto resident, local government was distant and unconcerned.
For the poor person, particularly the poor black ghetto resident, the
possibility for effective change either in his personal life style or in the
political system appeared remote.' Reflecting upon this gulf between the
poor black ghetto resident and his government, the Commission noted,
"No democratic society can long endure the existence within its major
urban centers of a substantial number of citizens who feel deeply
aggrieved as a group, yet lack confidence in the government to rectify
perceived injustice and in their ability to bring about needed changes."'
The growing sense of powerlessness and frustration among
disadvantaged minority groups and the poor in general can be
attributed, in part, to the lack of programs and procedures designed to
assist the poor in communicating with state and federal agencies, in
participating in the decision-making process, or in protesting arbitrary
* Member of the North Carolina Bar; Director of Research and Special Projects of the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Chicago, Illinois. A.B. 1962, Brown University;
LL.B. 1965. Columbia University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Miss Jane Ann Evans and Mr.
Thomas LaForge, students at the University of Chicago Law School, in the preparation of this
article.
I. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 287-88
(Bantam ed. 1968).
2. Id. at 288.
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administrative action. In addition, a combination of ignorance,
suspicion, and resentment of our judicial and political institutions has
resulted in poor persons often shunning whatever opportunities they
might have to gain formal review of unsatisfactory administrative
determinations.'
Given the poor's disenchantment with and distrust of our
established institutions, two trends seem to warrant particular attention.
The first trend is the developing realization that "the law" cannot solve
all the problems of the poor and the disadvantaged. Litigation may be
the most important means for effecting social justice and eliminating
patent discrimination, but legal solutions alone cannot eliminate poverty
or its effects. Nor will legal solutions necessarily give the poor a greater
voice in government or even ensure that their voice is heard. For
example, our nation's poor remain alienated, bitter, and distrustful of
our legal institutions despite the initial promise of Powell v. Alabama,
that there is a fundamental right to counsel in criminal cases and despite
landmark Supreme Court decisions within the past seven years that have
expanded and implemented the sixth amendment right to counsel at
practically all stages of the criminal process. 5 Moreover, the poor remain
singularly detached from the decision-making process despite the rapid
growth of legal service programs.6
3.

See Gellhorn, The Ombudsman's Relevance to American MunicipalAffairs, 54 A.B.A.J.

134, 138 (1968).
4. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment "embraced"
those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.
... Id. at 67.
5. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to counsel at preliminary hearing, a critical
stage of proceedings); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to retained or appointed counsel
during probation revocation proceedings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to
retained or appointed counsel during pretrial identification procedure); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I
(1967) (requires state to guarantee due process to all children alleged to be delinquent by
guaranteeing their right to adequate notice of charges, to retained or appointed counsel, to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, to be advised of the privilege against self-incrimination); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (person being interrogated in custody must be advised that he has
right to retained or appointed counsel during interrogation, right to remain silent, and that what he
says may be introduced into evidence against him at a later time); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964) (right to counsel upon request when person is taken into custody and is being interrogated
and the inquiry about crime begins to focus on him); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(prohibits government eavesdropping on conversation between defendant and government informer
in absence of defendant's counsel); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (right to counsel during
a preliminary hearing that is deemed a "critical stage" in the proceedings); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel to prepare criminal appeals); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel for indigent criminal defendant in more serious criminal trials). See
Gill, Current Trends in CriminalLaw and its Administration, POPULAR Gov'T 20 (June 1968).
6. See E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (Supp. 1961). See also THE
URBAN INSTITUTE, Design of an On-Site Evaluation System for the Office of Legal Services of the
Office of Economic Opportunity, Appendix 1 (1970).
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It has been demonstrated that the benefits of free legal advice and
services to the poor are neutralized if the poor are expected to continue to
support and respect institutions that have neither involved them in the
decision-making process nor sought to earn their confidence. It has been
suggested by many urbanologists, therefore, that the treatment of
citizens by police, welfare, housing, public utility, sanitation, health, and
school officials should be subject to public scrutiny through
administrative review and fair hearing procedures. The views of those
citizens most affected by the decisions of government agencies,
.moreover, should be solicited prior to the formulation and
7
implementation of bureaucratic policy.
The second trend has been a dramatic increase in the scope and
significance of the rulemaking authority of both federal and state
administrative and regulatory agencies since World War II. Congress
and state legislatures have enacted broad statutory provisions that
empower executive departments or agencies to interpret and apply a
variety of administrative rules and regulations to broad classes of
individuals. 8 Administrative agencies traditionally have borne the
responsibility for executing laws or applying general legislative
provisions to specific cases; however, administrative agencies, perhaps as
a response to the increasing complexity and technicality of the issues
subject to state and federal legislation, are now "increasingly in the
position of making more generalized rulings with the force of law."'
B.

Rulemaking and the Poor

The "rulemaking" referred to in this article is that defined by
section 1(7) of the Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act
and the corresponding section 2(c) of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act. 10 "Rule" means "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability . . . designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy, or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency .
7. "From the foot patrolman who would rather curb a riot than receive training in policecommunity relations, to the school administrator who would rather break a school boycott than let
parents decide what goes on inside the school, the agencies of the state have failed to involve the
neighborhood in the process of decision or to create a climate where the decision of others can be
respected." Berger, Law, Justice, and the Poor, in URBAN RioTs: VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
59 (R. Conney ed. 1968).
8. See Mikva, Interest Representation in Congress: The Social Responsibilities of the
Washington Lawyer, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 651, 654 (1970).
9. Id.

10. 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1964), asamended5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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"Rulemaking" means "agency process for the formulating, amending,
or repealing of a rule." 11
In essence, administrative rulemaking entails publishing proposed
rules and inviting interested parties to submit written comments on such
rules. i2 Theoretically, all persons are allowed to express themselves and
to call attention to the impact of possible policies on their particular
business activities or interests. The administrative agency's staff then
compiles and analyzes the presentations and data and prepares its own
report before the agency actually implements its proposed rules. 13 The
procedure has been touted as "one of the greatest inventions of modern
government;" superior in many ways to adjudicative procedure; fair and
efficient; and an excellent means for the "development of understanding
and for the reflection of democratic desires."14
Indeed, along with judicial decision-making, administrative
rulemaking serves as a vitally important instrument for social and
political change. There are, however, some crucial differences between
the two processes. For example, the administrative decision in a
rulemaking proceeding is embodied in a general ruling that inevitably
affects the interests of many groups or individuals, but the decision of a
court of law may affect only the party or parties immediately before the
court. If a judicial decision has application to classes of persons not
directly before the court, usually the judicial policy has been adopted
without the court's knowing or having the means to discover what the
impact of its decision will be on unrepresented parties. 15 The rulemaking
authority of an administrative agency, on the other hand, contemplates
all interested parties participating in the formulation and promulgation
of rules and the development of policies designed to affect classes of
individuals rather than a single individual. 6
Implied in any federal and state rulemaking authority is the
requirement that all relevant interests and viewpoints be considered prior
to the formulation of any rule. 17 It would seem reasonable that only after
such a comprehensive and inclusive examination could responsible
I1. Id.
12. See K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 65 (1969) (describing the rulemaking process as a
virtual duplicate of the legislative committee procedure).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 66.
16. See Mikva, supra note 8, at 654.
17. See Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV.
511 (1969).
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officials have confidence in the soundness of the rules they establish.,'
The nature of the proceeding can be so important and the material so
complex that an individual or corporation seeking a favorable
administrative ruling has as much need for the advice and assistance of a
"knowledgeable attorney" as he does when he confronts a judicial
tribunal. 1' It should come as no surprise, then, to learn that persons and
organizations with sufficient financial resources usually assure their
particular interests adequate representation in both state and federal
rulemaking. These individuals and their organizations monitor directly
6r indirectly all agency activities that concern their particular interests,
and they attempt to protect their interests through formal or informal
20
participation in rulemaking affecting them.
Rulemaking frequently affects the poor, but the poor usually are
unable, individually or as a class, to apprise themselves of the numerous
actual or proposed rules affecting their interests. The poor also may be
at a disadvantage because they frequently cannot communicate their
views effectively to the appropriate agency, or petition in their own
interest for the passage of new rules or for the amendment or repeal of
21
old rules.
There is a growing body of evidence to support the conclusion that
not all segments of society are represented before administrative
agencies, thus detracting from one of the principal attributes of the
administrative process. The poor, in particular, seem to be inadequately
represented both in federal rulemaking2 and, as this article suggests, in
state rulemaking. The poor, as a class, are of special concern in the
rulemaking process because they, more than any other segment of our
society, lack an articulate voice or lobby before legislative and
administrative bodies.23
No agency promulgating rules affecting the poor can assume that it
knows what is best for them. Rules affecting the poor should not simply
reflect the middle-class values and experiences of the agency personnel
engaged in the rulemaking process or the interests of parties who have
the resources to make their views known. The proper administration of
government demands that all persons be afforded an opportunity to
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
(1969).

Id.
See Mikva, supra note 8, at 654.
See Bonfield, supra note 17, at 511.
Id.
Id. at 512-20. See also notes 29-30 infra and accompanying text.
See Ashman, Justice For the Poor- Whither Next?. 27 LEGAL AID

BRIEFCASE

135, 136
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participate in the rulemaking process by making their views known.
Undoubtedly, respect for government suffers from the inability of
the poor to represent affirmatively their own interests in rulemaking. 4
C. Recent Interest in FederalRulemaking
At all levels of government, administrative agencies serve as
valuable instruments for carrying out social policy. It has been argued
that the fact-finding and rulemaking powers of administrative agencies,
in addition to their adjudicatory functions, "enable [them] to respond
more imaginatively and creatively than can courts to the new demands
and conditions which are constantly emerging in our society."
In part, it is concern for the poor in their relationship to
administrative agencies that has motivated people to begin thinking
about ways in which the administrative process, particularly in the area
of federal rulemaking, can affirmatively advance the interests of the poor
and be made more responsive to their needs. Representatives Michael
Feighan (D-Ohio) 26 and Abner J. Mikva (D-Ill.)2 and Senators Philip
Hart (D-Mich.) 2s and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) 21 have introduced
bills in Congress that seek to insure full participation by and on behalf of
unrepresented citizens in federal administrative rulemaking proceedings.
Senator Kennedy's bill, which is identical to representative Mikva's bill,
acknowledges that "there is substantial evidence that large segments of
the American public are not adequately represented in the Federal
rulemaking process, and that . . the views of those directly affected by
administrative agencies are frequently not heard in the formulation of
rules."' 30 To correct this condition, Senator Kennedy recommends the
creation of a "Public Counsel Corporation" to represent the interests of
the poor before federal regulatory agencies and to participate in
rulemaking on their behalf.3 1 This proposal closely parallels the
24. See Bonfield, supranote 17, at 512.
25.

Jones, The Role of Administrative Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L.

REv. 279, 299 (1967).
26. H.R. 1776, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 17974, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
27. H.R. 16174,91stCong.,2dSess. (1970).
28. S. 2544, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (co-sponsored by Senator Kennedy); S. 3703, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
29. S.3434,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
30.

31.

Id.

The relevant portions of S. 3434, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), read as follows:
SUBCHAPTER IV-PUBLIC COUNSEL CORPORATION
§ 581. Findings.
The Congress hereby finds and declares(1) that there is substantial evidence that large segments of the American public are not
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recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States
that a "People's Counsel Corporation" be established to represent the
poor in all federal administrative rulemaking.32
D. State Rulemaking
The problem of representation of the poor is not limited to the
rulemaking process at the federal level. In fact, the reasons advanced for

involving the poor in rulemaking before federal agencies are just as valid
and compelling for state and local agencies. State and local rulemaking
often carries more impact upon the daily lives of the poor than
rulemaking at the federal level. The need, therefore, is to involve the poor
directly in the rulemaking process in those states that have either
adopted the Model Administrative Procedure Act or modeled their

legislation after it. At the same time, states that have not yet adopted
adequately represented in the Federal rulemaking process, and that thus the views of those directly
affected by administrative agencies are frequently not heard in the formulation of rules;
(2) that the sound operation of the administrative rulemaking process demands that all
relevant interests and viewpoints be considered prior to the formulation and promulgation of an
administrative rule or regulation; and
(3) that to assure the interests of the public are considered, means should be established to
provide the unrepresented public with competent, consistent, and aggressive advocates in Federal
rulemaking.
§ 588.

Activities and powers of the corporation
(a) In order to carry out the objectives of this subehapter, the corporation is authorized

to(I) represent, either directly or by contract with appropriate individuals or
private organizations, the interests of the unrepresented public and, where appropriate,
separate interests of distinct groups within the unrepresented public, in proceedings
before regulatory agencies of the United States, either upon the request of any such
agency, or on its own initiative; provided that in carrying out its contracting authority
under this section, the corporation shall give preference to nonprofit organizations with
experience in representing the public interest before Federal agencies;
(2) initiate rulemaking proceedings in any regulatory agency when otherwise
authorized, upon the vote of two-thirds of the members of the board;
(3) collect and disseminate to all interested organizations and to the general
public information concerning rulemaking with particular emphasis upon rulemaking
and the interests of the unrepresented public;
(4) represent, upon request, individuals or private organizations who seek
judicial review of Federal administrative actions whenever the executive director
determines that the issues involved in such review substantially affect the interest of the
unrepresented public;
(5) perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law.
32. For recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States with respect
to representation of the poor in agency rulemaking of direct consequence to them see Comment,
Interim Report of the Administrative Conference of the UnitedStates, 21 AD. L. REV. 491, 504-Il

(1969).
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such legislation must be encouraged to pass administrative procedure
acts requiring notice of proposed rulemaking and permitting
participation by interested parties.
Little information is available on state rulemaking, particularly with
respect to the extent and impact of participation by the poor in the
rulemaking process and the effect of state rulemaking upon them. The
remainder of this article will attempt to emphasize and illustrate the
importance of state rulemaking and its special impact upon the poor; the
nature of existing state administrative procedure legislation, particularly
regarding provisions for notice and participation in rulemaking; the
extent to which notice and participation actually occur in those states
that have administrative procedure legislation; and the effect of notice
and participation wherever it does occur.

II.

IMPORTANCE OF STATE RULEMAKING

A.

Scope of State Rulemaking

In discussing the scope of state rulemaking, one could generalize by
characterizing it as being marked by broad federal delegations of
authority permitting state and local agencies to define critical
substantive matters. 3 The lives of the poor are affected daily by
administrative decisions at the state and local level in such areas as
welfare, housing, education, consumer protection, and urban renewal.
For example, in the areas of public welfare and public housing, always of
immediate and overriding concern for the poor, important substantive
decisions have been delegated by the federal government to the states. In
many instances, the states have further delegated responsibilities to
county and municipal authorities.Y Local welfare agencies administering
federally assisted programs for dependent children, the elderly, and the
disabled often have wide discretion in fixing eligibility standards. These
decisions, both formal and informal, directly affect the poor but rarely
involve them. Under the Federal Social Security Act, for example,
requirements are imposed on the states as conditions for participation in
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) grant-in-aid
program. Most of the federal statutory provisions are permissive. The
federal statute allows the states to determine the criteria of need, levels of
33. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
479,481 (1966).
34. See, e.g., REPORT OF ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE.
WHAT IS THE BAR DOING? (1965); Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF.
L. REv. 642, 656 (1966); Handler, supra note 33, at 492-503.
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income and resources that will be included in the budget, and the
minimum level of income for the recipients, subject, of course, to a
federally imposed maximum.3 Sometimes such discretion is exercised
unwisely, as in California where the AFDC housing cost schedules for
1967, 1968, and 1969 recently were invalidated by a state trial court. The
trial court found that the schedules were adopted without notice and
hearing and did not reflect the minimum amount necessary for AFDC
recipients to obtain safe, healthful housing. The California Department
of Social Welfare was ordered to promulgate new cost schedules.3 6
In Wisconsin, although a state agency supervises the AFDC
program, county welfare agencies actually administer the program. The
state agency "assists the counties in [developing] their programs,
supervises their activities, and advises the local agencies of federal and
state requirements. At both the federal and state levels there [is] a
conscious attempt to provide flexibility and a large measure of
autonomy and discretion at the county level." 37 For example, Wisconsin
regulations set forth extensive criteria to be used by county case workers
38
in deciding whether the AFDC mother should work.
In public housing, tenant eligibility also is determined by a
combination of federal legislation and local rule although the only
"requirement" of federal law is that poor persons be allowed in public
housing. Federal law does require local public housing agencies to adopt
admission policies pursuant to their "responsibility" for rehousing
displaced families and for determining the status of an applicant. These
local policies take into consideration whether an applicant for public
housing is a serviceman or veteran, his age, disability, housing
conditions, and urgency of housing need. Other than these rather
minimal requirements, "federal law is silent on eligibility for public
housing" and "offers little guidance" either for administering a project
or for terminating a tenancy.3 9 Generally, local public housing
35. Handler, supra note 33, at 492.
36.

Ivy v. Montgomery, CCH Pov. L. REP.

11,573 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 1969).

Despite this and other successful instances of judicial review of administrative action, some
observers think that it is unwise to depend upon reviewing courts to accomplish significant changes

in administrative behavior because (1)"much of the informal administrative process is not
susceptible to judicial review" and (2) the courts are concerned almost exclusively with procedural
matters and "what the agencies do to people and their property is largely beyond judicial scrutiny,
as long as procedural steps are properly taken or adequate 'findings' are made." Handler, supra

note 33, at 49 1.
37. Handler, supra note 33, at 492-93.
38. Id. at 493. Many AFDC programs have provisions relating to the "employable mother,"
requiring that "under certain conditions, the mother of an AFDC family seek or accept
employment outside the home." CCH Pov. L. REP. T 1220, at 2191.
39. See Friedman, supra note 34, at 656-57.
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authorities are given broad rulemaking powers and can "impose rules
and regulations upon the tenants-provided only that the rules are not
illegal or so scandalous as to arouse rebellion. 40
The problem for the poor is not that the rules and regulations of
state and local agencies are secret. Most state and local agencies publish
either formal rules or handbooks and guides that embody their rules and
regulations. In the area of public housing, local housing authority rules
appear in leases, though it is doubtful whether anyone ever reads them.
To be sure, many welfare agencies still make it difficult to obtain copies
of their rules and schedules. Yet, when considering the importance of
state rulemaking and the involvement of the poor in that process, secret
rules usually do not pose a serious problem. As one observer notes, in the
context of public housing administration, "management is not insane: It
' ' 41
wants its rules to be known and to be followed.
Rather, the problem for the poor, and others similarly affected by
state and local rulemaking, "is what the rules say and who decides
them. ' 42 Rules emanating from state and local administrative agencies
have not always appeared humane or even rational. Arbitrary and, in
some instances, "lawless" actions on the part of some governmental
agencies affecting the lives of the poor have been documented
frequently. 43 Such aberrations serve not only to dramatize the
importance of state and local rulemaking but also to emphasize the need
for directly involving the poor in the decision-making process in matters
directly affecting their lives.
B.

Illustrationsof State Rulemaking Directly Affecting the Poor

Certainly one can point to many sound, rational, and humane state
and local rules. Indeed, criticizing the substance of a particular state rule
or regulation is not necessarily a criticism of the procedure by which the
rule was promulgated. But bad rules are, in a real sense, the product of
deficiencies in the rulemaking process, and bad rules affecting the poor
are in part attributable to the lack of participation of the poor in state
40. Id.at661.
41. Id.at662.
42. Id. It has been pointed out that courts do not appear "willing or able to run public
housing authorities" (or welfare departments and boards of education for that matter). Courts
might require these agencies to comply with certain rulemaking procedures, but they are not likely
to be concerned about what the rules actually say.
43. See, e.g., Sparer, The Poor Man's Lawyer and Governmental Agencies, in NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LAW AND POVERTY: PROCEEDINGS 37 (1965); P. WALD LAW AND POVERTY 30-31
(1965).
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rulemaking. It is in this context that the following illustrations are
offered.
1. Public Welfare Administration.-The Alabama "man in the
house" rule serves as an excellent illustration of the promulgation of an
irrational and insensitive rule later struck down upon judicial review."
Approximately '20,000 children had been denied AFDC assistance
because of a rule promulgated by the Alabama Department of Pensions
and Security, which disqualified otherwise eligible children from
receiving AFDC support if their mother cohabited with a man who was
not obligated by Alabama law to support the children. The United
States Supreme Court held this "substitute father" regulation invalid
because it defined "parent" inconsistently with the National Social
Security Act. The Court held that the regulation violated Alabama's
federally imposed obligation to furnish "aid to families with dependent
children . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals
''45

The Supreme Court recently held that Maryland's family
maximum regulation does not violate either the Social Security Act or
the equal protection clause. 4 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
rejected the petitioner's contention that the family maximum
contravened the command of the Social Security Act that assistance be
furnished to all eligible individuals. The Court chose to interpret the
Social Security Act as requiring only that "some" assistance be
extended to all eligible families. The majority also rejected the
contention that the Maryland regulation had the effect of splitting up
47
families in violation of the fundamental purposes of the Act.
In response to a suit challenging the constitutionality of the
Mississippi Department of Public Welfare's failure to provide prior
hearings in entitlement cases, Mississippi promulgated new regulations
designed to continue assistance pending a hearing and decision on any
44. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
45. Id. at 317, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. II,1964).
46. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in Dandridge
on grounds that the Maryland regulation was in violation of the Social Security Act. Id. at 490. Mr.
Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, also dissented, asserting that Maryland's family
maximum violated both the Social Security Act and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
guarantee. Id. at 508.
47. 397 U.S. at 479-80. For an excellent discussion on the "emasculation" of the equal
protection clause as a poverty weapon because of the Dandridge decision and for a useful exposition
on permissible methods for states to compute need in light of Dandridge see May, Supreme Court
Approves Maximum Grants; Holds § 402(a)(23) Permits Welfare Cuts, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
321, 322 (1970).
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proposed termination of benefits." Subsequently, Mississippi
substantially diluted the effect of this rather liberal rule by excepting

from its coverage actions to suspend or reduce the size of a grant.
The NOLEO (Notice to Law Enforcement Officers) requirement
also is an excellent example of local administrative discretion. The

requirement varies in its specific content from state to state. For
example, a mother applying for or receiving AFDC assistance may be

required, "as a condition of initial or continuing eligibility, to identify
and give information about the father of her children if he has deserted

or abandoned the family." 49 In some jurisdictions a mother, in addition
to identifying the father, must file a claim for support against him, or

initiate a paternity action if he is not her husband and has not
acknowledged his paternity of her children. Evidently the state's

rationale for imposing such requirements is "to obtain support
payments from the absent father and correspondingly to reduce the
family's AFDC grant." 50 Welfare regulations in the District of

Columbia require "as a condition of initial or continuing eligibility that
when a husband or parent fails to support, an applicant or recipient
must take appropriate action in a court of the proper jurisdiction
"51

For many years, North Carolina's rural poor found that their
AFDC benefits were reduced or terminated at the beginning of each
tobacco season by many county welfare departments. 52 The welfare
48. See Williams v. Gandy, Civil No. GC 6728 (N.D. Miss., filed June 9, 1967) (one of the
earliest prior hearing cases which was dismissed when Mississippi promulgated its new rules).
49. Silver, Suggested Attacks on the NOLEO Requirement-Part1, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1 (1970). Another example of a rule that works a great hardship on the poor and permits wide
latitude in local administration is a "don't work" rule enforced in many parts of California. The
state statutes permit full welfare and medical assistance to all needy children whose fathers do not
work or work only part-time, whose fathers desert them, and to all illegitimate needy children. The
rule specifically singles out and penalizes one classification-all children whose fathers are
employed full-time but earn less than would be received from welfare. See 1969 CAL. RURAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE ANN. REP., pt. 12, Exhibit I1.
50. Silver, supra note 49.
51. See 2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
POLICY AND PROCEDURE, RS 6, Public Assistance, RS 6.4, 1. A. For examples of state regulations
"typical of the NOLEO regulations and practices of the state welfare agencies" see the Florida,
Illinois, and D. C. regulations in Silver, supra note 49 at 1, 13.
52. See Project-The Legal Problems of the Rural Poor, 1969 DUKE L.J. 495, 545
[hereinafter cited as Project]. The practice of cutting off welfare assistance to farm workers when
work "is available" is also a problem in Kern County, California, where the County Welfare
Department has been charged with arbitrarily cutting off aid to welfare recipients when farm labor
is available. In one instance the welfare department discontinued benefits to a migrant farm worker
on the grounds that he had secured work. The facts actually appear to be that the worker had only
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departments' actions followed alleged investigations of the income of
families receiving AFDC. The "investigations" actually consisted of
landlords or farm operators informing the local welfare department of
the families that would be working during the tobacco season." The
wages that all the members of a family could earn by working were then
computed, and the family's benefits were reduced by that amount or
terminated if the maximum level was exceeded. The family was then
placed in the situation of either choosing to work for the employer or
reapplying for benefits. The welfare departments' criteria for reducing or
terminating benefits were based not upon what families actually were
working or their actual earnings, but upon what families could be
working and what a family could earn by working. On the contrary
North Carolina regulations stipulated that benefits were to be affected
only when the earnings of family members actually employed caused the
income of the family to rise above maximum levels.54 The practice of
allowing employers to notify the welfare department as to who would be
working and to have benefits cut off on the basis of that information
permitted the employer to select his work force from welfare recipients
and "to insure that they would be willing to work since their other means
of support would be unavailable." ' 55 Interestingly all the welfare
recipients reporting these tobacco season cuts "did nothing about it,
accepting the explanation of the welfare
department that when work was
56
available their benefits would be cut."'
2. Public Housing Administration.-Local housing auuthorities
generally have broad discretion in promulgating rules and regulations
governing both tenant selection and tenure and eviction. A regulation
passed by the Chicago Housing Authority, for example, is typically
broad; its effectiveness hinges upon the interpretation of the term
"undesirable. 5' 7 The regulation defines an undesirable tenant as one
who "imperils the health, safety or morals of his neighbors, or is the
source of danger to the property or to the peaceful occupation of the
tenant, or is remiss in his normal obligations as a tenant." Obviously,
temporary employment and no further assurance of any more farm work. Letter from John R.
Ortega, Associate Attorney with California Rural Legal Assistance of McFarland, California, to
Allan Ashman, Aug. 20, 1970.
53. Project.supra note 52, at 545.
54. N.C. Pub. Assistance Reg. § 321(3)(a).
55. Project,supra note 52, at 545.
56. Id. at 544.
57. For a reprint and discussion of Chicago Housing Authority Resolution 55-CHA-275, F
see K. DAVIs, supra note 12, at 77-78.
58. K. DAVIs. supra note 12 at 78.
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the concept of "undesirable," which remains undefined for the most
part, "confers enormous discretionary power [on administrators] to
control many aspects of the lives of the tenants who are . . . unable to

fight.

. .

official arbitrariness.

' 59

The power that resides in an official to interpret "undesirable" as
he chooses and to enforce his determination against individual families
by ousting them from their established homes is indeed an arbitrary
power and one that is totally inconsistent with sound or rational
government.6 0 Rather than confer such unbridled discretion, the
regulations should specify whether a family becomes "undesirable"
because of specific changes in their circumstances-the separation of a
husband and wife, divorce, imprisonment for a misdemeanor,
imprisonment for a felony, and suspended sentence for a felony."
The federal statute offers little guidance as to the administration of
housing projects or the termination of tenancy; state laws offer little
more. Generally, the states have adopted the income limits prescribed by
federal law.12 Some states specifically provide for the problem of the
over-income tenant. In New Jersey, for example, the over-income tenant
may be permitted to continue his residence until his income exceeds the
maximum for entry by 25 percent. There are many variations among
states. Some states spell out their preferences-veterans often are placed
in a preferential class-but, in the main, tenant selection is left to the
local housing authorities."
There are many dramatic and poignant examples of rule-bound
local authorities, unwilling to temper principle with common sense. 5
There are numerous rules and regulations, for example, prohibiting the
keeping of dogs in high-rise housing units. As one observer notes, "Half
a million people in New York City must choose between subsidy and
pets." 66 Although the wisdom and practicality of these rules remain
doubtful, the housing authority has been successful in overcoming
legislative attempts to change this practice. Similarly, the New Orleans
Housing Authority ruled that blind tenants could keep their seeing-eye
dogs only after public indignation and outrage over the prohibition
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
See id. at 78-80.
Id.
See Friedman, supra note 34, at 656-57.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14-20 (1964).
See Friedman, supra note 34, at 657.
Id. at 658. See also Sparer, supra note 43, at 42-43.
Friedman, supra note 34, at 661.
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forced the change. In addition, there have been several recent cases
challenging the constitutionality of the imposition of quotas on the
number of blacks who may occupy public housing in predominantly
white areas and the selection of sites for public housing on the basis of
67
the racial composition of the neighborhood.
As in welfare administration, then, the broad discretion afforded
local housing authorities to adopt rules and regulations and "manage"
their respective programs often slips too easily into arbitrary fiat and
callous mishandling.
3. Consumer Protection.-In California, the Spanish-speaking
telephone subscribers from San Francisco, Sonoma, and Imperial
Counties recently filed a complaint before the California Public Utilities
Commission seeking a reduction in telephone rates for Spanish-speaking
subscribers and protesting a proposed Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
(PT&T) application for a rate increase." The essence of the complaint of
the Spanish-speaking telephone subscribers is that they have been, and
are being, denied effective use of the phones solely and exclusively
because of PT&T's unlawful and discriminatory refusal to provide or
hire bilingual operators to assist Spanish-speaking persons in using
information services, and most important, in using PT&T's emergency
fire, police, and hospital connection services. The complaint describes a
demonstration where it is alleged that high level PT&T officials agreed
that anyone suffering a heart attack who could not speak English would
literally risk death; nevertheless, the complaint alleges that these officials
reiterated their basic position that, in effect, they had no responsibility to
promote or protect the "safety and health" of their subscribers.69
The Spanish-speaking complainants, on behalf of approximately
300,000 Spanish-speaking telephone subscribers in California, allege not
only that no rate increase can legally be granted as to Spanish-speaking
subscribers, but also that the basic phone rate for all Spanish-speaking,
non-English-speaking subscribers should be reduced by 50 percent,
retroactive to January 1, 1970.70 In conjunction with their petition for a
67. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
68. See Petitioner's Brief, 144 Spanish-Speaking Tel. Subscribers v. Pacific Tel. &Tel. Co.,
No. 9042, (Cal. Pub: Util. Comm'n, filed Apr. 2, 1970). In the area of consumer protection,
generally, it would be worthwhile to look at the final draft of the UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES
PRAcrcEs Acr § 6, wherein an "administrator" is authorized to enact substantive rules saying

what is a deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction.
69. See Petitioner's Brief, 144 Spanish-Speaking Tel. Subscribers v. Pacific Tel. &Tel. Co.,
No. 9042 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, filed Apr. 2, 1970).
70. Id. The complainant's petition notes that the California Public Utilities code specifically
prohibits any rate increase to any group denied services "necessary to promote [their] safety, health,
comfort and convenience ...
" CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 451 (West 1956).
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rate reduction, the complainants also petitioned the Public Utilities
Commission for review of a hearing examiner's final decision denying
their "Consumer's Fair Hearing Plan." ' 7' The plan was a proposal to
allow and encourage adequate and equal consumer representation at
public utility rate hearings. The plan provided that adversely affected
low-income consumers and their representatives be allocated a sum by
the Public Utilities Commission equal to one-fiftieth or two percent of
the total to be expended by a public utility in its efforts to secure a rate
increase. This sum would then be used for witness fees, transportation,
and costs related to preparation for a hearing.
The complainants point out that the anti-consumer effect of the
hearing examiner's decision is best illustrated-by his April 1, 1970 ruling.
At that time, the hearing examiner ruled that no written material could
be submitted to the examiner without copies being provided to the
approximately 100 interested groups that had entered appearances
before the Commission. Obviously, the cost of providing 100 copies
would be prohibitive for the low-income groups involved. The complaint
argues that the effect of such a ruling is to chill adequate representation
because no group representing the poor could afford to submit any
written material in opposition. The Consumer's Fair Hearing Plan was
designed to counter the effect of this ruling by providing these lowincome groups with sufficient funds to make copies available to all
interested parties pursuant to the ruling of the hearing examiner.
The foregoing examples drawn from public welfare, public housing,
and public utility administration are meant to be illustrative of the range
and impact of state and local administrative rulemaking upon the poor,
but these areas are not the only areas of public administration where
some form of representation for the poor is needed before state and local
agencies. Public education 72 and urban renewa 7 3 administrations, for
example, have not always actively involved the poor in the decision71. California Rural Legal Assistance Petition for Review of Hearing Examiner's Final
Decision Denying Consumer's Fair Hearing Plan (Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal. 1970).
72. See. e.g.. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (attacking the practice of
"ability grouping"). See also Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. 1964) (requiring a
student who married to withdraw from school for a full year, with only the possibility of thereafter
being admitted as a special student); State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 262, 175
N.E.2d 539 (C.P. Ct. Butler County 1961) (requiring immediate withdrawal from school upon
knowledge of the pregnancy of a student); Alvin Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d
76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (denying a married mother admission to a public high school); Sparer,
supra note 44 at 40-41 (attacking "suspension" of students without a hearing or opportunity to
defend themselves).
73. See, e.g., Frieden, The LegalRole in Urban Development, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 856, 86970 (1965).
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making and rulemaking process and have, in fact, frequently heightened
the problems of the poor in these respective areas. Countless other
illustrations could be cited to reflect the inadequate representation of the
poor and of minority interests before state and local agencies. As in
federal rulemaking, there is a growing body of evidence to document not
only the importance of state and local rulemaking, particularly as it
affects the poor, but also to support the fact that large segments of the
American public are not adequately represented in the state rulemaking
process.
III.

NOTICE AND PARTICIPATION UNDER STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACTS

The adoption of administrative procedure legislation by the states
providing for notice and participation is an important first step toward
involving the poor in state rulemaking. Realistically, such legislation is
essential to guarantee that citizens are given an opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking process. Without this legislative vehicle,
there may be no legal compulsion for guaranteeing citizens notice of
proposed rulemaking or authorization to participate in rulemaking. In
states with no administrative procedure act, interested parties have no
formal procedure by which to voice their substantive wishes.
What about those states that have administrative procedure acts?
Thirty-six states have enacted a basic administrative procedure vehicle
providing for notice and participation. 74 Nine of the states have
patterned their provisions after the Revised Model Administrative
Procedure Act promulgated in 1961 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 75 Even in these 36 states, the
legislation may be rendered inoperative either by provisions that
74. For a composite of the statutes of the 50 states see Appendix I. The information contained
in this Appendix is based, insofar as it is possible, upon statutes and legislation cited in the most
current state codes and supplemental pocket parts.
75. The 9 states are Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Vermont,
Washington, and Georgia. With regard to notice and participation, the Revised Model Act
provides:
"(a) Prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule, the agency shall:

(I) give at least 20 days' notice of its intended action. The notice shall include a
statement of either the terms or substance of the intended action or a description of the
subjects and issues involved, and the time when, the place where, and the manner in
which interested persons may present their views thereon. The notice shall be mailed to
all persons who have made timely request of the agency for advance notice of its rulemaking proceedings and shall be published in [here insert the medium of publication
appropriate for the adopting state];
(2) afford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or
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effectively exclude a group from active involvement in rulemaking or by
the lack of provisions affirmatively including interested parties in the
process. Has the legislative vehicle, in fact, proved operative? Have the
poor actually been able to benefit from the opportunity to participate in
the rulemaking process? By looking at provisions of representative state
administrative procedure acts, one can document, to some extent, how
citizens, and particularly the poor, are excluded at the threshold of the
administrative process from participating in rulemaking.
A.

Notice of ProposedRulemaking

One of the most important features of the Revised Model Act is the
requirement that an agency give notice of proposed rulemaking.

Practically, such notice is a prerequisite to participation in rulemaking
by interested persons. The Revised Model Act requires that notice be
published and mailed directly to persons who have requested it. The
notice must contain a statement of the proposed rule or the subjects
place, and manner for views of interested persons
involved and the time,
76
known.
made
be
to
Direct notice is particularly important to the poor because they lack
exposure to the sources of information, such as newspapers, in which
notice of proposed rulemaking may be printed. Yet, of the 36 states with
statutes covering notice of proposed rulemaking, fourteen do not require
that notice be mailed directly to interested persons who have requested
arguments, orally or in writing. In case of substantive rules, opportunity for oral
hearing must be granted if requested by 25 persons, by a governmental subdivision or
agency, or by an association having not less than 25 members. The agency shall
consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule. Upon
adoption of a rule, the agency, if requested to do so by an interested person either prior
to adoption or within 30 days thereafter, shall issue a concise statement of the principal
reasons for and against its adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the
considerations urged against its adoption.
(b) If an agency finds that an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare requires
adoption of a rule upon fewer than 20 days' notice and states in writing its reasons for that
finding, it may proceed without prior notice or hearing or upon any abbreviated notice and
hearing that it finds practicable, to adopt an emergency rule. The rule may be effective for a
period of no longer than 120 days [renewable once for a period not exceeding -days], but
the adoption of an identical rule under subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2) of this Section is not
precluded.
(c) No rule hereafter adopted is valid unless adopted in substantial compliance with this
Section. A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of this Section must be commenced within 2 years from the effective
date of this rule."
REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§ 3(a)-(c) (1961).
76. Id.
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it.7Y In Arizona, for example, notice of proposed rulemaking is to be filed
only with the Secretary of State.78 Interested persons in Arizona would,
therefore, have to maintain a constant check with the Secretary's office.
In Kansas, interested persons may request notice, but whether they
receive it is subject to the discretion of the Attorney General. 7 Whether
this kind of approval requirement actually is prejudicial to the interests
of a group is difficult to determine and not really at issue. What is
significant is that it adds to the appearance of government arbitrariness
and fuels charges of "playing politics."
Some states require notice to be issued only "so far as
practicable."0 Such ambiguous statutory language can easily lead to
frequent and unsubstantiated findings of impracticability, by an agency
thus sacrificing participation by justifiably interested persons on the
altar of administrative efficiency and economy.
In states where interested persons are not notified directly of
proposed rulemaking, the notice function may be impaired to such a
degree that interested parties may never become aware of a rule until it is
too late, and the only recourse for change is through administrative or
judicial review proceedings. Meanwhile, the citizen has lost the
opportunity to be heard initially and the agency promulgating a rule has
lost the benefit of a citizen's views.
B.

Manner of Participationby Interested Persons in Proposed
Rulemaking

In states that provide for participation in rulemaking, interested
persons, after receiving notice, may submit data, views, or arguments to
the rulemaking body. These presentations take the form of oral
testimony at a public hearing, written testimony, or both. The written
testimony form of argument is employed most often. It is favored
because it is an economical method since the decision-making process is
not materially slowed by the actual appearance of interested parties.
77. The 14 states are Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Vermont, and Wisconsin. For relevant

statutory sections see Appendix I.
78.
79.

ARIz. REv.STAT. ANN. § 41-1002 (1956).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-421 (1969).

80. This qualification was part of § 2(3) of the original Model State Administrative
Procedure Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1946. It survives in a few state acts that are based on the 1946 Model Act: Maine, Michigan,
Oregon, and Texas. For statutory sections see Appendix I. The Maryland Administrative Procedure
Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 244-56 (1965), which is also based on the 1946 Model Act, does
not have this qualification. See also note 98 infra.
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The oral hearing"' is mandatory in only ten states and then only if it
is requested by a specified number of individuals or an association with a
specified number of members.8 2 In the other 26 states with statutory
provisions for participation in rulemaking, the availability of an oral
hearing is at the discretion of the agency.e Oral argument may often be
more effective than a written submission to convey to the agency the
views and information of interested parties. Interested parties, and in
particular the poor, may be unskilled and unsophisticated in developing
and preparing a written argument. For them an oral presentation may
prove more beneficial from the standpoint of an informative and
productive meeting.Y An oral confrontation also may have a more
dramatic impact on the rulemaker, enhancing the possibility of greater
receptivity to the views presented.

Whether a presentation is oral or written, the most important
consideration is that the 'poor be able to have their views heard in a
dignified and receptive atmosphere. In the final analysis, the individual
and collective attitudes of the rulemakers is of paramount importance. If
the rulemaking authority is receptive to the views of the poor, a
competent, written submission may prove to be sufficient

communication with an agency; however, if an agency is hostile or not
receptive to the views of the persons affected by the proposed rules, an

oral presentation with all its potential for dramatic impact on the
consciousness of the rulemakers may still prove futile.
81. It should be emphasized that an "oral hearing" or "oral presentation of views, data, and
argument" should not, normally, take the form of what Professor Kenneth Culp Davis terms a
"trial-type" of hearing with all its trappings such as confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses, discovery, impartial tribunal, and right to counsel. See K. DAVIs, supra note 12, at 228.
The reason for this distinction lies in the fundamental nature and objectives of a trial and agency
rulemaking. Because the facts serve different functions in the overall purpose of the 2 proceedings,
the most efficient manner for presenting facts differs. For example, in the trial the object is to settle
disputed facts, and the submission of evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses, and the presence
of counsel all serve to narrow the range of possible and alleged facts to the actual facts. In
rulemaking, however, the general objective is to make law or policy and the formal narrowing of
facts does not serve the general goal of informing the rulemakers as to the overall situation that is in
need of remedy or the persons most affected by the proposed rule or regulation. Also, the imposition
of the trial method on the rulemaking process can be counter-productive. An important attribute of
the oral argument in the rulemaking proceeding is informality and flexibility. Thus it is asserted that
the proper type of hearing is the argument or "speechmaking" hearing, which generally is more
conducive to the exposition of views by interested parties and the exploration of those views by the
rulemakers. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 6.06, 7.07 (1958); 2 id. § 15.03.
82. These 10 states are Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. For relevant statutory sections see Appendix 1.
83. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-703 (Supp. 1969) (agency shall "afford all interested
persons reasonable opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments, and, if the agency in its
discretion shall so direct, oral testimony or argument").
84. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
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C.

"Escape Clauses" and Exclusions

Several state administrative procedure acts contain "escape
clauses" and exclusionary definitions that weaken the rulemaking
mechanism. These clauses and definitions either exempt certain agencies
and types of rules from the operation of the acts or allow all the
requirements for rulemaking to be waived. For example, under the
Nebraska statute covering adoption of rules by state agencies, "[tihe
Governor, in writing prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any
rule, may waive, for good cause shown, the provisions of this section."
The effect of such a provision may be to eliminate completely the
requirement of a public hearing and to allow an agency to adopt a rule
without any participation by interested persons.
In Massachusetts, an agency may dispense with requirements of
notice and opportunity to present views if the agency finds that such
requirements are "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public
interest.""6 This discretionary power is limited when the adoption of
regulations requires a hearing by any other law, or when the violation of
the regulation is punishable by fine or imprisonment. 87 Sound public
policy underlies the requirement for a hearing before adoption of these
two types of regulations. Requiring a hearing where another law so
dictates permits continuity and consistency in the interpretation of state
law. In addition, when a fine or imprisonment will be imposed for the
violation of a proposed regulation, a required hearing permits added
assurance that the fundamental interests at issue-in this instance a
citizen's freedom from incarceration and fine-are protected. The
Massachusetts exclusionary statute is too restricted and short sighted.
Freedom from fines and incarceration are two important interests, but
they are not the only interests that merit protection, nor are they
necessarily the most important. Yet, where other substantial interests
are affected-such as the amount of welfare allotments-a hearing is not
required. Whether interested parties may appear to testify on such
matters is left to the discretion of the particular agency, %whichmay
simply rely upon the language of the statute and hold that a hearing is
"unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public interest."
Other states also have provisions in their administrative procedure
NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-907 (1966).
86. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 3(3) (1966). See also Harris v. Board of Registration in

85.

Chiropody, 343 Mass. 536, 179 N.E.2d 910 (1962) (even though it would have been appropriate to

allow the plaintiff to present suggestions on a proposed rule, the Board was not required to allow
such suggestions).
87. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 2 (1966).
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laws that nullify for all practical purposes the statutory requirements for
participation in rulemaking. For instance, the Colorado Administrative
Code, after setting out a complete procedure for rulemaking, limits its
application by providing that "[w]here a specific statutory provision
applies to a specific agency, such specific statutory provision shall
control as to such agency." ' The statutory provision applying to a
specific agency may not provide for notice and participation.
Exclusions also are created by the insertion of an "emergency"
clause, which provides that if the public good requires the immediate
adoption of a rule, notice and participation are not necessary. The
duration of such a rule usually is limited to 60, 90, or 120 days,
depending on the state.8 9 The Revised Model Act recognizes that public
safety may require that agencies be able to promulgate emergency rules,
but limits the effectiveness of the rule to 120 days."
In Texas, the exclusion is accomplished by definition. The statute
providing for notice and participation defines "rule" to include
procedural but not substantive rules.9 1 The requirements of notice and
participation, therefore, do not apply to substantive rules that may
seriously affect the rights of individuals. Thus, in Texas there would be
no requirement of notice or an opportunity to participate in hearings on
a proposed decrease in welfare allotments.
The escape clauses and exclusions noted herein do not discriminate
solely against the poor. Any citizen can be excluded from participating
in state rulemaking under these provisions. A few states, however, have
definitional exclusions that specifically prevent the poor from
participating in rulemaking. An example can be found in the Oklahoma
statutes. The State's Public Welfare Commission is excepted from the
definition of "agency. 9' 2 As a result of this restrictive definition, the
requirements of notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity to be
heard do not apply to the welfare commission. The Louisiana
Department of Public Welfare also is excepted from the operation of its
state's administrative procedure act by a similar restrictive definition. 3
Narrowly defining "rule" to exclude those rules that relate to
grants or benefits by a state or agency is another kind of restrictive
88.
89.
ANN.

§

90.

91.
92.
93.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-6 (1963).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.0412(5) (1964) (60 day limit); COLO. REV. STAT.
3-16-2 (1963) (90 day limit); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-26-5 (1967) (120 day limit).
REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3(b).
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13, § 1(b) (1962).
OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 75, § 301 (Supp. 1969-70).
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.951 (Supp. 1970).
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definition that limits the ability of the poor to participate in welfare
rulemaking. The effect of such a definition is that the rules or regulations
promulgated by a state welfare department concerning the eligibility for
assistance or the amount of assistance may be adopted without notice to,
and participation by, interested persons. The administrative procedure
statutes of Georgia9 4 and Pennsylvania9 5 contain this restrictive
definition of "rule."
Although many states have adopted administrative procedure
legislation providing for notice of proposed rulemaking and an
opportunity for interested parties to participate in the rulemaking
process, other provisions in the same acts may render the notice and
participation provisions useless. Despite administrative procedure acts,
poor citizens residing in these states have, in effect, no formal vehicle for
making their views known to the rulemakers. The Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act does give the poor a practical and
effective vehicle to present their views on proposed rules. The first
concern of the states, then, must be to adopt the Model Act, or some
variant thereof that requires notice of proposed rulemaking and ensures
participation without tacking on emasculating escape clauses and
definitional exclusions.
IV.
A.

ACTUAL PARTICIPATION BY THE POOR IN STATE RULEMAKING

GeneralInformation on Nature and Extent of Surveys Conducted

Given the proliferation of state and local administrative agencies in
recent years, it would be a Herculean task to survey every state
administrative agency to determine the degree of participation by the
poor in the rulemaking process and to assess the impact of such
participation. Such a task might well be the subject of a future study, but
it is beyond the scope of this article. The previous section affords some
opportunity to speculate on the extent to which notice and participation
might occur in given states; however, it is not an accurate gauge for
determining the extent to which notice and participation actually occur.
Nor does it reflect the effectiveness of notice to, and participation by, the
poor in state agency rulemaking.
In an attempt to formulate some preliminary judgments about
actual participation of the poor in state agency rulemaking and to
determine whether such participation has proved effective,
94.

95.

GA. CODE ANN.
PA. STAT. ANN.

§ 3A-102(f)(9) (Supp. 1969).
tit. 45, § 1204 (Supp. 1970).

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

questionnaires were sent to all state welfare departmentsm and selected
legal services programs.9 By contacting all 50 state welfare departments
the hope was that, at least with respect to those particular departments,
some preliminary judgments could be made about the degree of actual
participation by the poor in state administrative rulemaking. It was also
hoped that some indication could be obtained of whether there is a
difference between those states without statutory provisions for notice
and participation by interested parties and those having some form of
administrative procedure legislation-whether or not based on the
originaP or Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act.9
State welfare departments were selected for the survey because they,
perhaps more than any other state agency, deal with the poor. Their
responses"9 offer a limited but nevertheless revealing glimpse into state
administrative procedure and the role of the poor in this procedure. In
order to gain a slightly different perspective on the participation of the
poor in the state rulemaking process, particularly before state and local
welfare departments, certain legal services programs were asked to
comment on their experiences with state agency rulemaking.1 1 The legal
services programs selected were located in states that have an
administrative procedure act and whose welfare departments had
already indicated that there was a high level of participation by the poor
12
in rulemaking.
B.

Summary of Responses of State Welfare Departments

1. States with No Statutory Provisionsfor Participationin
Rulemaking.-Questionnaires were sent to welfare departments in the
fourteen states with no statutory provisions for participation of
96. For questions directed to the state welfare departments see Appendix 11, A-D.
97. For questions asked of legal services programs see Appendix III.
98. The section of the original model act pertaining to notice and participation reads: "Prior
to the adoption of any rule authorized by law, or the amendment or repeal thereof, the adopting
agency shall so far as practicable, publish or otherwise circulate notice of its intended action and
afford interested persons opportunity to submit data or views orally or in writing." MoDEL STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT § 2(2).

99. See note 75 supra.
100. See Appendix II. Surveys of this nature must be viewed in perspective. With regard to
this survey not all 50 state welfare departments responded to the questionnaire, even after a followup letter. These states may be notable exceptions to the trends cited in the survey. Also, in many
instances, replies to the questionnaire probably reflect the personal, subjective views of the

respondent and not necessarily an unbiased view of the department's role in the rulemaking process.
For these reasons alone, this survey cannot be interpreted as being either inclusive or conclusive.
101. See Appendix Il.
102. See Appendix II.
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interested persons in state agency rulemaking. 1 0 Twelve state welfare
departments replied to the questionnaires.'" In these states evidence of
actual participation by the poor in rulemaking before state welfare
departments is, as might be expected, practically nonexistent. Only two
state welfare departments, Delaware and North Carolina, reported
sending any form of notice of proposed rule changes. Delaware's welfare
department notifies only individuals or groups considered interested or
affected by proposed rules; however, the department does not indicate
how it determines who is interested or affected. In North Carolina, the
mass media carry notices of public hearings.
Where the welfare departments do indicate that there is some
participation in rulemaking, the actual form of participation varies.
Advisory committees and public hearings are the most formal means of
participation. For example, advisory committees that include poor
persons make recommendations to the board or staff of state welfare
departments in Alabama, Iowa, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah.
The Utah Department of Social Services reports that it also meets with
interested parties to learn their views. In North Carolina, despite the
absence of an administrative procedure act, the Department of Social
Services holds public hearings to provide a forum in which the poor may
make their views known prior to the promulgation and implementation
of a rule or regulation.'0
In the other states where there is no statutory provision for the
participation of interested parties in state agency rulemaking, the
customary method of ascertaining the views of the poor seems to be
through correspondence from the poor or through the regular
administrative process, including fair hearings, complaints, and reports
of field staff. Almost always this occurs after the actual promulgation
and implementation of a rule. Only welfare departments in Utah and
North .Dakota report actual changes in rules as .a result of
communication with interested low-income persons. The Utah
department reports that meetings with the State Welfare Rights
Organization led directly to changes in the rules of'the Division of
Family Services. In North Dakota, a group of AFDC mothers
organized to express their views regarding public welfare rules, and the
Public Welfare Board notes that the mothers have successfully promoted
several rule changes."'
103. See Appendix I.
104. See Appendix 11, A.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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It would seem fair to conclude that in those states without any
formal procedure for participation of interested persons in state agency
rulemaking, the power to determine whether there is to be participation,
how it shall occur, and who is to participate rests primarily with
individual state welfare departments. In a sense, such discretionary
power in the hands of an individual state agency rests upon a false
assumption. It assumes that an agency usually is capable, on its own, of
understanding the purposes and implications of its rules and the needs
and values of those persons most likely to be affected by them. It
assumes that, prior to the promulgation of a rule, it is the agency that
can best determine whether more information is needed and who might
be the appropriate persons to provide this information. Such
assumptions are both presumptuous and dangerous, particularly for
agencies dealing primarily with the poor. It is presumptuous because it
assumes, without foundation, a cultural and ideological rapport between
the rulemakers, who for the most part sustain middle-class values on
middle-class incomes, and the poor. It is dangerous because it severely
restricts participation by interested citizens in the decision-making
process and often makes government appear indifferent and inaccessible.
2. States with Administrative Procedure Acts Not Based on
Originalor Revised Model Act.-Questionnaires also were sent to the
state welfare departments in 22 states with administrative procedure acts
not based on either the original or Revised Model State Administrative
Procedure Act. Sixteen welfare departments replied to the
questionnaire. 1 w They indicated, generally, more participation by the
poor in rulemaking than did the welfare departments in states with no
administrative procedure act. All of the state agencies that replied
indicated that they either have advisory committees that include welfare
recipients or they authorize public hearings.
Even though there may be provision for public hearings or advisory
committees, the lack of required notice can deter actual participation. 08
In Florida, there are no public hearings, but any person can attend
meetings of the Advisory Council." °9 Yet, lack of notice in Florida
rulemaking reduces the possibility that the poor actually will participate
in the process. In addition, several state welfare departments indicate
little or no participation by the poor in the rulemaking process even
though notice is given and public hearings are held. The Rhode Island
107.
108.
109.

See Appendix II, B.
See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
See Appendix II, B.
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Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services, for example, cites no
instances of actual participation by the poor in agency rulemaking,
despite the fact that public hearings are held and notice is published in a
newspaper. The Connecticut State Welfare Department also indicates
that the poor generally have failed to inform the department of their
views on proposed rules even after the department published notice of
intent to promulgate a rule.
3. States with Administrative Procedure Acts Based on Original
or Revised Model Act.-Questionnaires were sent to welfare
departments in fourteen states with administrative procedure acts based
on either the original or Revised Model State Administrative Procedure
Act. Eleven departments replied to the questionnaire." 0 Only two state
welfare departments-Idaho and Washington-offer little evidence of
participation by the poor in rulemaking. The other departments cite
instances of participation by the poor."' The Maryland Department of
Social Services offers perhaps the most impressive evidence of
participation by the poor in state agency rulemaking. Welfare recipients
participate in meetings of the State Welfare Board, and committees that
include the poor help formulate policy. Notice is sent to numerous
groups and individuals. The Department also reports that a special task
force recently sent questionnaires to low-income persons in order to
2
learn their views on proposed rules on services to single parents.1
C. Summary of Responsesfrom Selected Legal Services Programs
The responses of the legal services programs solicited do not
indicate significant participation by the poor in state agency rulemaking.
On the contrary, the responses provide little evidence to support
assertions by state administrative agencies that the poor, or their
representatives, actually participate in agency rulemaking. 1 3 The central
theme of the responding programs seems to be that even in states where
there is a statutory vehicle for participation of the poor in state agency
rulemaking, the actual level of participation by the poor often is quite
low.
The legal services program in Ramsey County, Minnesota reports
that "the poor do not participate in the rulemaking proceedings of state
agencies. This is particularly true of the State Department of Public
110. See Appendix II, C-D.
11I.Oklahoma does not cite a high level of participation, but Oklahoma's Public Welfare
Commission is excepted from the Administrative Procedure Act. See Appendix I.
112. See Appendix 11, C.
113. SeeAppendix Ill.
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Welfare. . . . The State Welfare Department not only does not
encourage the poor to participate in the rulemaking process, but actually
discourages said participation."" 4 Similarly, the Legal Aid Foundation
of Long Beach, California, and the Laramie County Legal Services,
Inc., of Cheyenne, Wyoming, replied that their respective state welfare
departments discourage participation by the poor in the rulemaking
process. In response to a reply by the Vermont Department of Social
Welfare to the questionnaire, the Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., of
Burlington, Vermont, charged that contrary to the image of cooperation
and participation conveyed by the Department, the Department has
consistently violated state law and denied participation." 5
The Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Denver, Colorado, reports
that even though its attorneys comment at monthly meetings of the State
Board of Public Welfare, and even though the Department of Social
Services now accepts participation as a matter of principle, actual
participation by the poor still has little impact on the substance of a
particular rule or on the decision to implement it."' Thus, Colorado has
a statutory vehicle permitting participation by the poor in the
rulemaking process and the vehicle actually is utilized; however, the end
product of such participation generally does not reflect the input of the
Legal Aid Society on behalf of the poor.
Discrepancies between the responses of welfare departments and
legal services programs in the same state probably indicate that although
a state may have procedures permitting participation by interested
parties in the rulemaking process, these procedures are, in fact, not
utilized fully or effectively. Where existing state statutes provide
interested persons with the means to participate in the rulemaking
process and the poor still do not participate, the blame for such inaction
probably can be apportioned equally among the poor, their
representatives, and the state agency involved. The poor, and those who
are acting on their behalf, often are either oblivious to the possibilities
for participation in the rulemaking process or simply negligent in not
pursuing existing avenues for participation. State welfare departments
do not promote participation when they deny, arbitrarily and sometimes
unlawfully, interested persons the opportunity to participate in
rulemaking proceedings or are hostile and unreceptive to the views of the
poor when they do participate.
At the same time, two legal services programs cite productive
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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instances of participation. The Greater Lansing Legal Aid Bureau of
Lansing, Michigan, states that the Department of Social Services
encourages participation and that "interested persons participate to a
considerable degree in the rulemaking process." 11 7 Both legal services
programs contacted in New Mexico report that their participation in
state agency rulemaking was productive. They cite as an important
factor the receptivity of the director of the Department of Health and
118
Social Services.
V.

INVOLVING

THE

POOR IN STATE RULEMAKING-SOME
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The economic, social, and political problems of the poor cannot all
be solved through litigation. In a real sense the problems of the poor
stem from a lack of bargaining power-"power to demand a fair share
of the resources of this society."" 9 Clearly, the law is an effective vehicle
for equalizing the balance of power in our society and for making city
and state governments more responsive to the poor, but it is only one
vehicle. If the poor are to secure such power, and if government is to
increase its responsiveness, it is vital that the poor be given some voice,
some sense of control, over their economic and social destiny as it is
affected by their government.
Participation by the poor in state and local agency rulemaking is a
modest but nevertheless practical step toward achieving this objective.
The rulemaking authority of an administrative agency contemplates that
all relevant interests and viewpoints be considered prior to the
formulation and promulgation of any rule. Policy decisions made by
state and local public welfare, public housing, education, and health
officials are manifested daily in rules and regulations affecting all
citizens, particularly the poor. It is crucial, therefore, that states have
procedures for participation and that the poor, traditionally less
outspoken on these matters, not only make their views known, but have
skilled assistance to insure that their message is presented effectively and
persuasively. In addition, the poor must see that their activities have had
some effect.1 0
Realistically, before the poor can participate effectively in state and
local rulemaking, states that have not yet done so must first enact
administrative procedure legislation requiring notice of proposed
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See 1969 CAL. RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
120. See Sparer, supra note 43, at 45.
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rulemaking and authorizing participation by interested parties. Such
legislation must be free of "escape clauses" and exclusionary definitions
that serve only to weaken the rulemaking mechanism. In those states
that have adopted administrative procedure acts, it is necessary that the
poor, either directly or through their representatives, utilize the statutory
vehicle provided them. There are, for example, many means by which the
poor, individually or as a class, can make their views known to state
agencies prior to the promulgation and implementation of rules and
regulations. Local legal services programs, welfare rights organizations,
tenant unions, and consumer organizations should be called upon to
monitor state administrative agencies on behalf of the poor and to serve
as spokesmen for the poor in agency rulemaking. If additional funding is
required either to coordinate efforts or to carry out this task, each legal
services program or poor people's organization should seek funds to
secure the staff needed to carry out this function.
Another possibility for giving the poor a voice in state rulemaking is
to create a "People's Counsel" in each state, modeled after the
recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States
for a Federal People's Counsel. 121 The state people's counsel could
consist of an individual or organization whose prime responsibility
would be to represent the collective interests of the poor as a class in all
state and local administrative rulemaking substantially affecting the
poor. The state people's counsel would also be charged with assuring
that the views of "significant separable minority interests" among the
poor are represented in state rulemaking and with disseminating to all
poor people's organizations pertinent information concerning
rulemaking. 122 The people's counsel could be created by the state as a
quasi-public, private corporation modeled after the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting, 23 or funded independently as a pilot project by a
university through its law school or school of public administration or a
private foundation, or all three.
. Each approach-whether it entails working through existing legal
services programs or poor people's organizations, or experimenting with
the concept of a state people's counsel-represents a new avenue for
participation by the poor in the rulemaking process. In addition, each
approach should assure that state administrative decision-makers are
better apprised of the interests of the poor and permit more important
affirmative contributions and input by the poor to the entire rulemaking
process.' A
121. See note 32 supra.
122. Id.
123. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. IV, 1969).
124. See Bonfield, supra note 17, at 554-55.
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